Chapter 3 Estimating the Likelihood of Winning Parliamentary Constituencies

Introduction
In this chapter we begin a comparison between the two major protagonists in Indian elections -the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Indian National Congress (INC). The comparison relates to the relative efficiency of the two parties in winning constituency battles and in converting votes into seats. This chapter places emphasis on the probability of winning elections. It provides estimates of such probabilities and shows how these differ between the BJP and the INC. In so doing, the first port of call is the 'marginal constituency': a constituency where the margin of victory between the winner and the runner-up is so small that the result could have been reversed with a small shift in votes from the winner to the loser. In the context of such constituencies we first estimate the separate likelihoods of INC and BJP candidates winning marginal seats, in post-1984 Lok Sabha elections, after controlling for factors, like inter alia incumbency and turnout.
We next consider, in this chapter, consider all constituencies in which the INC and the BJP went 'head-to-head' in the sense that both fielded candidates in those constituencies. In estimating the likelihoods of the INC and the BJP winning 'head-to-head' we used the econometric estimation method of bivariate probit which allowed the testing of inter-party differences.
Lastly, the chapter considers the electoral performances of the INC and the BJP separately for the Hindi-speaking and the non-Hindi speaking major Indian states. The seven Hindi-speaking states -Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Uttarakhand, and Uttar Pradeshprovide 204 seats of the total of 543 Lok Sabha seats and these are of particular importance to the BJP because a large part of its contested constituencies are from these states: in the Lok Sabha elections of 2014, 192 of its contested 428 constituencies were from these states.
Marginal Constituencies
A marginal constituency is one where the difference in votes received between the winning party and the runner-up is so narrow that the result could have been reversed with a small shift of votes away from the winner. In this book we adopt -admittedly on arbitrary but, it is to be hoped, not unreasonable criteria -two definitions of a marginal constituency: (i) the difference in vote shares between the winner and the runner-up was 10 percentage points or less so that, under this definition, a shift of five percent of the constituency vote away from the winner to the runner-up would have reversed the result; (ii) the difference in vote shares between the winner and the runner-up was 5 percentage points or less so that, under this definition, a shift of 2.5 percent of the constituency vote away from the winner to the runner-up would have reversed the result. The important point that emerges from about Table 3 .1 is the growing presence of marginal constituencies in the total of constituencies. In 1971, when the INC won 352 seats, one in four constituencies was a "ten point" marginal and "five point" marginals comprised 12 percent of total constituencies. By 1984, when the INC won 414 seats, "ten point" marginals and "five point" marginals comprised, respectively, 28 and 15 percent of total constituencies and, in the elections since 1998, marginal seats have come to dominate reaching an apotheosis in 2009 of 63 percent of all constituencies decided on a margin of 10 percent or less and 36 percent of all constituencies decided on a margin of 5 percent or less. This would suggest that targeting key groups of voters is (or should be) an increasingly important part of electoral strategy in India since small swings in support can, more than ever before, make the difference between forming a government or sitting in opposition. <Table 3.2> Table 3 .2 shows the distribution of marginal constituencies, across the major Indian states, for the 2014 Lok Sabha elections. Of the 178 marginal constituencies (at a 10 points difference) in the major Indian states, 113 (63 percent) were located in the six states of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Karnataka, Kerala, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal. In Kerala, 80 percent of constituencies were "marginal"; in Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka nearly two in three constituencies were "marginal"; and in Bihar and West Bengal nearly one in two constituencies was "marginal".
The Likelihood of Winning Marginal Seats
Against this background, an important question in Indian politics -and, indeed in electoral politics in general -are the relative strength of the factors which determine whether or not parties win marginal seats. Using econometric techniques, we attempt to tease out, for India' two leading political parties, the INC and the BJP, answers to this pressing, and complex, question.
In order to do so, we estimated for the INC -across the 14 elections between 1962 and 2014 -a logit equation on data for "ten point" marginal constituencies, in the 20 major Indian states (listed in Table 3 .2), in which the INC was either the winner or the runner-up. These, collectively, yielded a total of 1,989 constituency observations. A similar equation was estimated for the BJP on data for "ten point" marginal constituencies, in the 20 major Indian states in which the BJP was either the winner or runner-up. Since the BJP only made its electoral debut in the 1984 Lok Sabha elections, the data related to the nine elections between 1984 and 2014. These, collectively, yielded a total of 1,009 constituency observations. respectively, the probabilities of the party winning from constituency i, i=1…N, the logit formulation expresses the log of the odds ratio as a linear function of K variables (indexed k=1…K) which take values, 1, 2 ...
where: β k is the coefficient associated with variable k, k=1…K.
From equation (2.1) it follows that:
where, the term 'e', in the above equation represents the exponential term.
The explanatory power of the logit equations are shown in terms of the 'Pseudo-R 2 '. The 'Pseudo-R 2 ' is a popular measure of the model's performance in binary models and compares the maximised log-likelihood value of the full model (log L) to that obtained when all the coefficients, expect the intercept term, are set to zero (log L 0 ) and is defined as: 1-(log L/log L 0 ). The measure has an intuitive appeal in that it is bounded by 0 (all the slope coefficients are zero) and 1 (perfect fit).
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The dependent variable in the logit equations estimated in this section took the value 1 for a (marginal) constituency if the party (INC or BJP) was the winner in that constituency and the value 0 if the party (INC or BJP) was the runner-up in that constituency. 4 In some of these contests in marginal constituencies the INC and the BJP went head-to-head (meaning, one was the winner and the other the runner-up) but, in other contests, the INC and the BJP went head-to-head with other opponents.
5
There were seven variables which were hypothesised to play a significant role in determining the outcome (winner or runner-up) in a marginal constituency:
1. The share of the total votes received by the party in that constituency.
2. Whether the party held the constituency in the previous election (that is, it was the 'incumbent' party). 3. The percentage of the electorate voting in that election ("turnout").
4. The number of independent candidates in the election.
5. The number of 'other' (that is, third, fourth etc.) party candidates in the election.
6. The year of the election.
7. The state in which the constituency was located.
In order to allow for non-linear effects, the squared value of 'vote share', 'turnout', 'the number of independent candidates', and the number of other' parties, was also included in the Tables 3.3 and 3 .4 are presented, for subsequent analysis, in the form of the predicted probabilities or, equivalently, predicted likelihoods (the terms 'probability' and 'likelihood' are, hereafter, used interchangeably) computed from the estimated logit coefficients, from which these probabilities are derived, and not in terms of the estimates themselves. In other words, the subsequent analysis uses the expression in equation (3.2) to compute the outcome probabilities where these are derived from the coefficient estimates of equation (3.1). This is because the logit estimates themselves do not have a natural interpretation -they exist mainly as a basis for computing more meaningful statistics and, in this case, these are the predicted probabilities of winning under a variety of configurations.
It should be emphasised that these predicted probabilities will, in general, differ from the sample proportions. This is because the predicted probabilities are computed after controlling (or adjusting) for the effects of the conditioning variables (noted above) while the sample proportions represent raw, unadjusted data. Since a property of the logit model is that it passes through the sample mean, the overall predicted probability, from the logit model, of winning a marginal constituency will be the same as the overall sample proportion of marginal constituencies in which the party was victorious. However, while the estimated model passes through the overall sample mean, it does not pass through the means of the different sample subgroups. This is illustrated in Table 3 .5 which compares, for each year and in aggregate, the predicted probabilities and the sample averages. The two quantities differ for each election (though they follow each other closely over the elections) but are the same when aggregated over all the elections. <Table 3.5>
The general methodology for computing the predicted probabilities was to calculate, for each of the observations (1,989 for the INC; 1,009 for the BJP), the probability of winning the election under a hypothetical situation (Scenario 1) in which some of the independent variables took specified values (for example, the variable 'year' was set to 1967), the values of the other independent variables (turnout etc.) being as observed. This then yielded 69.2 percent as the predicted probability of winning a marginal constituency in 1967.
In order to obtain the predicted probability of winning in 1971, the variable 'year' was set to 1971, the values of the other independent variables being as observed. This then yielded Scenario 2.
The difference in the average probability of winning between the scenarios could then be ascribed to the change in the value of the independent variable(s), in this case between the years 1967 and 1971.
Election-on-election changes in the probability of winning marginal constituencies 
Incumbency Effects
The Electoral Performance of the INC and the BJP Compared
The previous section examined the electoral performance, in marginal constituencies, of the INC and the BJP. This was, however, conducted separately for the two parties without attempting to assess their comparative performance. So, for example, we examined, for marginal constituencies in which the INC was the winner or the runner up, the likelihood of it winning the election regardless of who its closest opponent was: this could have the BJP, or another party, or even an Independent candidate. In similar vein, we examined the likelihood of the BJP winning in marginal constituencies, in which it was the winner or the runner up, regardless of who its closest opponent was: this could have the INC, or another party, or even an Independent candidate. By contrast, in this section we make a head-to-head comparison of the INC and BJP by analysing all the constituencies that were contested by both parties. <Table 3.8> Table 3 .8, which sets out the number of constituencies contested by both parties, shows that the proportion of all Lok Sabha constituencies contested by both parties has increased from 41. This system of two probit equations (bivariate probit) is the discrete choice analogue of the Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equations (SURE) method of estimation with continuous dependent variables (Greene, 2003, 710-19) . Like SURE estimates, the estimates from the bivariate probit system are more efficient than those obtained from estimating each equation as a single equation because the correlation between the error terms of the two equations is explicitly taken into account.
In addition, and more importantly for the purpose of this analysis, the fact that the equations are estimated as a system allows hypotheses to be tested between equations rather than just within individual equations. As we will see, this allows one to arrive at an assessment of the comparative electoral efficiency of the INC and the BJP.
The estimates from the bivariate probit equation, estimated on data for the 2,684 constituencies contested by both the INC and the BJP over 1989-2014, are shown in Table 3 .9. The same conditioning variables were used in both the probit equations -one for the INC, the other for the BJP -and, indeed, are those used in the logit analysis of the previous section. 9 To recapitulate, these were:
i. The share of the total votes received by the party in that constituency.
ii. Whether the party held the constituency in the previous election (that is, it was the 'incumbent' party).
iii. The percentage of the electorate voting in that election ("turnout").
iv. The number of independent candidates in the election.
v. The number of 'other' (that is, other than the INC and the BJP) party candidates in the election.
vi. The year of the election.
vii. The state in which the constituency was located 9 Listed in Table 3 .9 which mirrors the listing in Tables 3.3 Table 3 .10 compares the predicted probabilities of the INC and the BJP winning Lok Sabha elections between 1989 and 2014 in constituencies, in the 20 major Indian states, which they both contested. Aggregated over all these elections, the first row of Table 3 .10 shows that the INC had a 30.6 percent chance of winning an election compared to the BJP's 40.5 percent and, furthermore, reading across the row, this difference of nearly 10 points was significantly different from zero. For every election in this period, except for the 2009 election, the predicted likelihood of the BJP winning was greater than that of the INC and, for several elections (1989, 1996, 1999, 2004, and 2014) , this difference in the likelihoods was significantly different from zero. <Table 3.11> Table 3 .11 compares the probabilities of winning for the INC and the BJP under different scenarios for the vote share obtained. If the INC received 35 percent of the vote then ceteris paribus its predicted probability of winning would be 22.6 percent; if, on the other hand, the BJP received 35 percent of the vote then ceteris paribus its predicted probability of winning would be 31.5 percent.
Under a 40 percent vote share scenario, the predicted probabilities of winning would rise for both parties, but the BJP's probability would still be higher than that of the INC: 50.8 percent against 39.6 percent. The pattern was repeated when each party received a hypothetical 45 percent share of the total vote: both likelihoods of winning would rise further but the BJP advantage in terms of a higher winning probability would continue (69 percent versus 60.2 percent).
Hindi versus non-Hindi Speaking States
Of The comparison between the electoral performance of the INC and the BJP, in constituencies where both parties were contestants, was made -separately for non-HS and HS major states -with respect to two parameters: (i) the overall probability of winning the constituency, the values of the conditioning variables taking their observed constituency values; (ii) the overall probability of winning the constituency when each party obtained a particular vote share; 35, 40, and 45 percent. <Table 3.12> Table 3 .12 shows that, in terms of the overall predicted probability of winning a constituency -computed over all the eight elections between 1989 and 2014, with the conditioning variables taking their observed constituency values -the electoral performances of the INC and the BJP, in constituencies they both contested, differed according to whether these constituencies were in non-HS or in HS states. The INC was much stronger in the non-HS states -at 40.7 percent, its average probability of winning in these states was significantly higher than the BJP's 28.2 percent; the BJP, however, was much stronger in the HS states -at 55.5 percent, its average probability of winning in these states was significantly higher than the INC's 18.7 percent.
These probabilities of winning varied when they were computed on an election-by-election As the results in Table 3 .13 show, the thrust of these results were not altered when the likelihood of winning was computed at different vote shares. for a 40 percent vote share in a HS state constituency [row HS:40 in Table 3 .13], the predicted probability of a BJP victory would be 68.2 percent compared to the INC's 45.8 percent; with the same vote share in a non-HS state [row NHS:40 in Table 3 .13], however, the INC would win with probability 34.9 percent compared to the BJP's 34.6 percent, a difference which was not statistically significant. The pattern was repeated under a hypothetical 45 percent share of the total vote: both likelihoods of winning would rise further but the BJP advantage in terms of a significantly higher winning probability in HS states would remain (83.3 percent versus 62.8 percent in row HS:45 of 
Concluding Remarks
This chapter represented the first step towards the overall purpose of this book which is to evaluate the relative electoral efficiency of India's two major parties -the INC and the BJP. Whether one considered the marginal constituencies in which the INC was the winner or the runner up (and a parallel set of constituencies in which the BJP was the winner or the runner up), or whether one considered the set of all constituencies which the INC and the BJP both contested, the answer always seemed to be the same: the average predicted probability of the BJP winning a Lok Sabha constituency election was, except for the 2009 Lok Sabha election, always greater than that for the INC.
When attention was narrowed to constituencies in Hindi-speaking states and those in nonHindi-speaking states, the advantage of the BJP over the INC in Hindi-speaking states (in terms of the average probability of winning constituencies in these states) was statistically significant; on the other hand, for constituencies in non-Hindi speaking states, the difference between the INC and the BJP in their respective probabilities of winning was not statistically significant.
It is important to emphasise that the results presented in this chapter are based on average probabilities: that is, the average of the predicted probabilities of winning individual constituencies.
So, the results should not be interpreted to mean that in every constituency the probability of a BJP win is greater than that of the INC. There will be constituencies where the INC was predicted to have a better chance of winning than the BJP but averaging over these probabilities, the BJP was better placed to win than the INC.
